The Repayment Pause and the Continuing Crisis of Non-Repayment

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Previous Millennial Student Debt reports may be downloaded at:
https://jainfamilyinstitute.org/series/millennial-student-debt/

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Introduction

Following the passage of the “Fiscal Responsibility Act” in June 2023, the three-plus-year-long student loan repayment pause looks set to expire by the end of this summer, even if the Supreme Court rules against the president’s authority to cancel student debt under the HEROES Act. In those circumstances, with hundred-plus billion dollars’ worth of new student loans issued every year, reducing (but not eliminating) monthly student loan payments for over-burdened borrowers will likely remain the administration’s preferred approach to the student debt crisis.

Since 1994, the federal government has run direct student loan programs that grant borrowers access to credit to finance their education on much more favorable terms than a privatized higher ed finance system would. The continued expansion of these programs, including ever-more-generous Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) terms (for borrowers who manage to navigate the red tape) signals that a focus on affordable repayment, tied to perceived ability-to-pay, will remain the federal strategy moving forward. But unlike IDR, the much more generous policy of the pandemic student loan repayment pause, which re-set the interest rate on federal loans to zero and made scheduled principal payments voluntary, has proven an effective way to alleviate the financial pressures resulting from both the student debt crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. With payments paused for over three years, plenty of studies, including this one, have reported that borrowers enjoyed financial gains.

Once the repayment pause ends, the administration plans to rely on federal programs that allow borrowers more affordable and lenient repayment obligations, while either accumulating unpaid balances or else canceling them in real time. This prompts us to take a closer look at repayment trends as a whole—before, during, and after the Covid-19 repayment pause—so as to update our November 2020 analysis, “The Student Debt Crisis is a Crisis of Non-repayment.”

The overall implication of the federal approach is that the system is humming along, issuing ever more debt, with no reasonable expectation of repayment. The massive higher education edifice therefore receives back-door federal funding, under the pretense that borrowers must eventually repay, which allows institutions to avoid the federal oversight and regulation of what amounts to a multi-trillion dollar outlay on higher education.

In this report, we study how some borrowers benefited from the repayment pause and analyze how that impacted their outstanding student debt and overall financial wellbeing.
We also share the first systematic findings about debtors who have had their outstanding loans canceled, over the last several years, via Public Service Loan Forgiveness, Defense to Repayment (a process whereby debt is expunged if the institution they attended misled borrowers or otherwise violated the law), or the expungement of outstanding debt associated with defunct or dis-accredited institutions. The main takeaway from these findings is that, in the absence of a repayment pause or outright cancellation, student debt continues to accumulate, without any chance of it ever being repaid.

It is thus a mistake to assume that the repayment pause benefited borrowers who would otherwise have repaid their loans. The more consequential impact has been on borrowers whose balances would otherwise have increased. Hence, our updated analysis of student loan repayment augments and strengthens the findings of our previous report: We argue that student debt isn’t going to be paid back, for structural reasons, which puts the onus on policy-makers to re-evaluate a system that originates hundred-plus billion dollars of new student debt every year—debt that will necessarily be written off, one way or another.

Data

Our dataset consists of individual credit reports, linked to demographic and economic data from the American Community Survey (which is linked by the borrower’s Census tract). The credit reports are available in several formats. We have both panel and cross-section data, at both the loan and individual consumer levels. For the panel data, one million consumers between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four with a positive student loan balance were sampled in 2009, and then followed annually through 2022 (regardless of whether they continued to have outstanding student loan balances). For the cross-section data, one million consumers in that same age range are sampled, independently, in each year from 2009 to 2022. The loan-level data consists of the loans of all of these people, which are linked to a unique consumer ID.

For this project, we confined our analysis to the sample years 2020 through 2022. Furthermore, we narrowed down our dataset to student loans with balances over $0 within twenty-four months prior to the sampling date. In the cross-section, this narrowed the dataset to roughly 4.5 million student loans per year, and between 990,000 to 994,000 borrowers per year. For the panel, isolating the study to the subset of borrowers who had not yet repaid all of their loans by 2018 made for a dataset that was much narrower than the cross-section. Some panel borrowers had simply re-enrolled in higher education in the years since 2009 and were repaying newer loans in 2020 through 2022, while others
struggled to repay the initial loans they held in 2009, which could have originated any time between that year and the 1990s. The yearly loan count in the panel varied from 1.7 million to 1.4 million student loans; the panel of borrowers decreased from 446,000 individuals in 2020 to 372,000 in 2022 (out of the initial million sampled in 2009–the balance having repaid their loans since).

For each student loan in our dataset, we utilize actual payment and balance amount for the twenty-four months prior to the sampling date (which is June 30th of each year).\(^1\) There are five repayment categories: (i) if a balance increases over time, the category is “balance increasing”; (ii) if a balance decreases over time, the category is “making progress”; (iii) if the balance stays stagnant over time, the category is “balance stagnant”; (iv) if the balance is $0 on the sampling date, the loan was not refinanced, and the balance has decreased over time by a total amount greater than the total payments made over the same period of time, the category is “loan canceled;” (v) if the balance is $0 on the sampling date, the loan was not refinanced, and the balance has decreased over time by a total amount that is less than or equal to the total payments made over the same period of time, the category is “loan paid.”\(^2\)

To our knowledge, this is the first systematic categorization of student loans that were canceled. It is telling that for all of our samples, more zero-balance loans are canceled than repaid– further indication of student loan non-repayment. However, due to servicing discontinuities, these findings (about the breakdown of zero-balance, non-refinanced loans into repaid versus canceled) should be regarded as tentative. Additionally, this report references the share of loans that are considered canceled, not the share of borrowers who received cancellation. We do not count a loan as canceled if it has been refinanced, discharged due to death, marked as a loss because the creditor is unable to find the borrower, or a debt that was sent to collection. We will return to this subject in future work, to analyze the effect of a loan’s cancellation.

Finally, each borrower in our sample may have a number of student loans, with various repayment categories. Based on the full spectrum of those categories, borrowers are categorized into a repayment profile. We analyze the demographics, financial health, and loan compositions of the borrowers across various repayment profile groups.

\(^1\) Experian refers to this backward-looking actual-payment and balance data as “trended.”
\(^2\) In fact, we employ a buffer between observed total payments and decreased balance amount, to account for the possibility that some actual payments may be unobserved due to servicer non-reporting of actual payments even if the servicer does report a record for the loan, enabling us to conclude the loan went from a positive to a zero balance. Without the buffer, we might erroneously categorize a zero-balance loan as canceled when it is in fact repaid.
Analysis

This report reviews how the overall repayment statuses of student loans have changed through the Covid-19 repayment pause, and how these loans affected the credit profiles of student borrowers. We categorized the borrowers based on how their loans were affected during the pause and then analyzed financial health trends for each borrower category. What we found is that the repayment pause delivered financial relief to a large swathe of the borrowers in our sample, across various borrower groups, demographics, and student loan types.

This report is split into multiple sections. The first section focuses on the cross-sectional sample, examining how the composition of student loans and borrowers adjusted in response to the pause (and other economic trends during the pandemic). After delineating loans and borrowers by repayment status, we look more closely at changes to borrower financial health, through proxy variables like credit score and delinquencies. The second section examines the effect of the pause on those in our panel dataset, which allows us to focus on a constant sample of individuals, albeit one that is not necessarily representative of all student loan borrowers. The conclusion discusses the implications of ending the pause and failing to enact widespread student debt cancellation, both of which are likely to take effect by late summer 2023.

Section 1: Student Loan Repayment Trends, 2020 to 2022

Part 1: Loan-Level

The following table lists the loan count in each year of our analysis and the share of loans in the five repayment status categories, as determined by recent balance and payment data. Looking exclusively at the repayment status across the millions of student loans in our sample, it is evident that the pause was by far the most dramatic policy enacted to date to ameliorate the student debt crisis. The 2020 data alone tells us that interest accumulation is a major issue in the student lending system—that year 42 percent of student loans had current balances that had grown in the previous twelve months. That share had dropped to just below three percent in our 2022 sample.
Table 1.1: Repayment Trends in Young Borrowers’ Student Loans (2020 - 2022 Cross-Sections)

The difference of 39.8 percentage points (42.6 percent of loans in 2020 with a “balance increasing” status versus 2.8 percent in 2022) can be directly attributed to the Covid-19 repayment pause, which reduced interest rates on federal loans to zero percent, which prevented student loan balances from accruing interest. Thus, balances on federal loans affected by the repayment pause did not increase, in contrast to private loans, which continued to charge interest and, if unpaid, accrue on balances. In effect, it meant that loans with increasing balances in 2021 and 2022, which represent 3.3 percent of all loans in 2021 and 2.8 percent in 2022, must have been private loans. The drastic reduction in the share of loans whose balances were increasing between 2020 and 2022 signifies that, absent the pause, the plurality of federal loans see their balance increase over time, contrary to the smooth path to full repayment contemplated by the structure of the federal direct lending program.  

Also of note is the year-over-year share of loans in the “loan paid” and “making progress” categories,” both of which declined. This change could be because federal borrowers

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3 (1) The vast majority (approximately 92 percent) of student loans are federal loans; and (2) borrowers who initially qualify for a private student loan (or borrowers who refinance their federal loans in the private market) generally have better credit profiles and are more likely to be able to repay their student loans.

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The Student Debt Repayment Pause
simply reallocated their student loan payments to other things, given the option. Or it could be that they lost sources of income or otherwise decreased in financial security, so weren't able to continue paying. It’s also possible that the 2022 further decrease, which we pulled at the end of June 2022, is due to the May announcement by the Biden administration that a plan for executive cancellation was in the works.

In the chart below, we track how repayment statuses changed between 2020 and 2022, by borrower race. As expected based on previous studies, as of 2020, Black and Latino borrowers were struggling to a greater extent than their peers with making progress on their loan balances. Thus, they benefited from the pause at greater rates. As of 2022, loans held by Black and Latino borrowers are more likely to have a stagnant balance. The implication is that the end of the pandemic repayment pause will cause disproportionate balance accumulation for those same borrowers.

A very important aspect of the pandemic repayment pause was that borrowers did not have to take any action to qualify—those with outstanding federal direct student loans were automatically enrolled. That is in sharp contrast to both Income-Driven Repayment and the executive cancellation announced in 2022, which required borrowers to disclose sensitive personal information (and in the case of IDR, annual “recertification” of that information) in an application. Regardless of how committed the Department of Education and other policy-makers are to ensuring a smooth path to resumed payments by enrolling borrowers in IDR post-pause, the most at-risk borrowers with the least understanding of the complicated administrative processes are likely to fall through the cracks.

We are already seeing that process play out in the end of the moratorium on Medicaid terminations that accompanied the end of the official pandemic emergency. Medicaid beneficiaries are being kicked off left and right, not because they are ineligible for the program, but because they did not complete the required paperwork in time. Shutting off the termination machine during the pandemic was the most egalitarian possible policy—and the same is true of student loan repayment. That is not what the administration is poised to do, however.

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4 We link publicly-available (U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey five-year estimates) racial plurality information at the census-tract level to the borrower’s census-tract information and apply the racial-plurality category to each loan.
Another method to quantify repayment status is to compare a loan’s current balance in relation to the origination amount, which indicates how repayment is progressing. The “balance growing” and “balance stagnant” categories each have average balances above what was originally borrowed. There are two aspects of the student lending system that cause loans to accumulate balances in excess of their origination amount. First, with in-school student loan deferrals for unsubsidized loans, as long as a borrower is enrolled in a higher education program, interest accumulates on top of unpaid loan principal. For that reason, the balance on loans that have not yet entered repayment or recently entered repayment are likely to be higher than at origination. Disconcertingly, we find that balance accumulation does not reverse when a borrower is supposed to have entered repayment. Instead, for a significant (and increasing) share of borrowers, the condition of being unable to afford repayment simply continues, pushing them either into delinquency and default, forbearance, or a reduced payment plan, in which interest accumulates and pushes loan balances upward. That is the second aspect and it creates a vicious cycle of unmanageable debt.

Figure 1.2: Status of Student Loans Across Racial Demographics (2020 & 2022 Cross-Sections)
As the cost of college continues to rise, in turn leading to larger loan balances at origination, the cycle of interest accumulation during in-school deferrals is sure to continue. Thereupon standard repayment plans (to retire the debt within ten years of entering repayment) will be increasingly unaffordable and interest will accumulate in greater amounts in forbearance or below-market repayment plans, leading to larger balances at all stages of repayment, lengthening considerably the time to repayment and reducing the probability that a loan will ever be repaid. The only policy that has ever ended this debt cycle is the repayment pause, and the cycle is all but guaranteed to restart once the repayment pause comes to an end.

Before the repayment pause, the share of loans that had balances above their origination amount—that is, the share of loans which had unpaid interest on top of the unpaid principal—had been growing steadily since the beginning of our sample in 2009. The Covid-19 repayment pause directly brought this trend to a halt and even spurred a reversal. As of 2022, the share of loans with a balance above the origination amount had fallen for two years in a row. This is significant, given that, as of 2020, over half of all the loans in the sample had outgrown their origination amount, as displayed in the table below.

![Student Loan Balances Relative to Origination (2020-2022)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student Loan Balances Relative to Origination (2020-2022)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of loans paid off, above, at, or below origination balance across three cross-sectional datasets each consisting of approximately one million young borrowers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Status (percent of all loans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance = $0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance &lt; Origination Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance = Origination Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance &gt; Origination Balance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations utilizing data from Experian Solutions, Inc. ©2023 Jain Family Institute

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5 See Figure 2.4, “Share of Loans where Current Debt Exceeds Origination Balance by Race,” released in December 2022’s report, “Student Debt and Young America in 2022.”
Table 1.3: Student Loan Balances Relative to Origination Amounts (2020 - 2022 Cross-Sections)

The decrease in the share of loans with a balance above the origination is attributable to the fact that new loans did not accumulate interest during the in-school deferral period, because interest rates on federal loans were fixed at zero during the repayment pause. When the repayment pause ends, most of the 13.9 percent of student loans whose balance amount equals origination are expected to transition into the “balance greater than origination” category. More specifically, a plurality of these loans would revert back to a “balance increasing” status and more loans than any previous year would be in the “balance above origination” category.

The “Current Balance > Origination Balance” category, which accounts for 52.1 percent of the sample of student loans in 2020 and 48.5 percent in 2022, warrants deeper investigation. The chart below plots the share of student loans that have balances above origination, disaggregated by loan age and borrower race, comparing the 2012 cross-section and 2022 cross-section.
Figure 1.4: Student Debt Non-repayment by Loan Age and Race (2012 vs 2022 Cross-Sections)

The share of loan balances above the origination amount peaks for loan cohorts that are three and four years old, with Black and Latino borrowers exhibiting the highest share of such loans. For the 2012 cross-section, after the peak, loans begin a downward trajectory, but the downward trend is less pronounced for Black borrowers. Conversely, in the 2022 cross-section, that trajectory is flipped for loan cohorts that are over three years old (i.e: for loans which originated before the repayment pause). These older vintages have constant or even increasing trajectories, with Black and Latino borrowers having the highest shares.

Furthermore, the newer loan cohorts for the 2022 cross-section have extremely low percentages of balances above origination, compared to new loans in 2012, where over a quarter of loans that are less than a year old have balances above the origination amount. Not only is interest accumulation at record lows for Covid-era loans, but a zero percent interest rate also reduces racial disparities. Whereas in the 2012 cross-section, a 12-percentage point racial disparity is apparent as early as two years into a loan vintage (53 percent of Black borrowers’ loans have balances above the origination amount as compared to 41 percent of Asian borrowers), in the 2022 cross-section the gap is much smaller (12 percent versus 11 percent, respectively). For the millions of borrowers who took out student loans during the Covid-19 repayment pause, the curtailing of balance growth early in the repayment life cycle has made for a more manageable path to eventual repayment.
The chart above draws on all of our cross-section samples from 2009 through 2022, to plot the share of student loans for which current balances are above the origination amount. We plot the share of loans for which this is the case in each vintage for each year since origination. For example, the oldest vintage in the figure consists of loans originated in 2008. The point on the horizontal axis labeled “14” means fourteen years following origination, i.e. 2022. The 52 percent reported in the chart means that 52 percent of the loans issued in 2008 had a balance greater than their original balance in 2022, fourteen years post-issuance.

We first reported this figure in our 2020 publication, noting that it illustrates how repayment isn’t happening within the standard ten-year window for most outstanding loans, and indeed that a rising share of loans in each vintage never saw declining balances. We also noted the inflection point for each vintage in 2016, when new and more generous Income-Driven Repayment plans were introduced, which were presumably an attractive option for many high-balance borrowers, despite the administrative hurdles. This updated version of the chart shows a leveling-off of the share of loans in each cohort with balances...

Figure 1.5: Share of Loans with Balance above Origination for 2008 - 2019 Loan Vintages, by Years since Origination (2009 - 2022 Cross-Sections)
above origination amount over 2020-2022, which is consistent with the previous evidence regarding the shift in the status of loans from balance-increasing to balance-stagnant. When the repayment pause ends, those trajectories will resume their upward march, unless borrowers enroll in the newly-proposed (but not yet enacted) IDR plan, which cancels unpaid interest in real time. That plan is essentially an indefinite extension of the repayment pause, at least for borrowers savvy enough to jump through all the IDR hoops that were waived during the pandemic emergency.

Part 2: Borrower Financial Wellbeing

For over three years, beginning in late spring 2020, borrowers have been freed from accumulating interest on their federal student loans. Millions have also benefited from expanded access to federal cancellation and forgiveness programs. This part of the report aggregates loan-level characteristics to the borrower level in order to analyze how repayment relief has thus far impacted borrowers’ financial health. While student loan relief had positive impacts across a variety of individual-level and macroeconomic measures, from social trends to consumer spending, this part of the report only focuses on the data made available via anonymized consumer credit reports.

We’ve pulled proxies for financial health for borrowers, whom we categorize based on their loan’s repayment status. The values in the table below exhibit the trends that might be expected for each borrower category. The typical credit score, share of borrowers with a mortgage, and delinquency share move progressively in-step with how the repayment pause improved borrowers’ financial status. Confounding variables are also at play. For example, the extremely low federal funds rate from April of 2020 through April of 2022, which provided access to affordable credit to millions of first-time homebuyers, many of whom were impacted by the student loan repayment pause. Hence, we see an increase in the share of borrowers who would otherwise be unlikely to have a home mortgage due to high and un-repaid student loan balances nonetheless qualifying between 2020 and 2022.

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We assign borrowers to repayment categories depending on the status of their loans, so the same borrower may be assigned to multiple categories if they have loans in those different categories. We refer to this as “mutually inclusive” borrower categories.
### Comparison of Young Borrowers by Loan Status (2020 & 2022)

Depicting the distribution of borrowers according to loan status, alongside median values of total current student loan debt, total original student loan debt, estimated income, and credit score. Also includes the percentage of borrowers holding mortgages and the proportion with delinquent student loans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loan Status: Making Progress</th>
<th>Share of Borrowers</th>
<th>Total Balance</th>
<th>Original Balance</th>
<th>Estimated Income</th>
<th>Credit Score</th>
<th>Share w/ Mortgage</th>
<th>Share Delinquent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>$16,853</td>
<td>$24,000</td>
<td>$72,283</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>$26,249</td>
<td>$33,700</td>
<td>$76,000</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loan Status: Balance is Stagnant</th>
<th>Share of Borrowers</th>
<th>Total Balance</th>
<th>Original Balance</th>
<th>Estimated Income</th>
<th>Credit Score</th>
<th>Share w/ Mortgage</th>
<th>Share Delinquent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>$28,257</td>
<td>$27,459</td>
<td>$52,266</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
<td>$19,773</td>
<td>$21,665</td>
<td>$58,000</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loan Status: Balance is Increasing</th>
<th>Share of Borrowers</th>
<th>Total Balance</th>
<th>Original Balance</th>
<th>Estimated Income</th>
<th>Credit Score</th>
<th>Share w/ Mortgage</th>
<th>Share Delinquent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>$27,583</td>
<td>$25,282</td>
<td>$54,490</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>$45,053</td>
<td>$43,240</td>
<td>$57,000</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations utilizing data from Experian Solutions, Inc.
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**Table 1.6: Financial Health Characteristics for Young Borrowers, by Repayment Status (2020 & 2022 Cross-Sections)**
Unsurprisingly, borrowers with no loan balance above origination amount are more likely to have lower debts and delinquency rates, as well as higher incomes, credit scores, and homeownership. This pattern is consistent both before and during the Covid-19 repayment pause. In 2020, 56.8 percent of borrowers in the cross-section had at least one loan with a balance above the origination amount (18.3 percent with one loan above origination plus 38.5 percent with two or more loans above origination), which is nearly identical to 2022’s share. However, those in the 2022 cross-section have much lower delinquency rates, because of the repayment pause, even as their incomes may be lower than their predecessors’. Likewise, homeownership rates increased significantly between 2020 and 2022, as did credit scores.

These cross-sectional samples only represent a snapshot in time, it is difficult to make definitive inferences about the causal impact that the repayment pause has. The next section utilizes the panel dataset of student loan borrowers, which provides a better

![Table 1.7: Financial Health Characteristics for Young Borrowers, by Count of Loans with Balance above Origination (2020 & 2022 Cross-Sections)](image)
picture of the repayment pause’s impact on the financial wellbeing of a constant set of borrowers.

Section 2: Impact of the Repayment Pause

In this section we focus on the set of borrowers in the panel, initially sampled in 2009, who still had outstanding student loans as of 2018: approximately 446,000 of the initial one million. While the panel borrowers are no longer nationally representative of the population of young student borrowers, it still allows us to follow that set of borrowers from 2009 onward.

As with the cross-section, a majority of borrowers in the panel were immediately affected by the repayment pause, as highlighted by the table below. Here too, the share of stagnant loans increases markedly, from just over 6 percent to over 63 percent. Relative to the cross-section, we observe a higher share of loans with increasing balances in 2021 and 2022, which is to be expected, as the borrowers in the panel were between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four in 2009, and therefore much more likely to have taken out Federal Family Education Loans (FFEL)—only discontinued in 2010, these are not eligible to benefit from the pause.
The Student Debt Repayment Pause

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trends in 2009 Panel Borrowers’ Student Loan Statuses (2020-2022)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tracking shifts in loan cancelations and balance progress among the 2009 panel borrowers with outstanding loans in 2020 to 2022.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Status (percent of all loans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Canceled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Paid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance is Stagnant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance is Increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Author’s calculations utilizing data from Experian Solutions, Inc. ©2023 Jain Family Institute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Repayment Trends in Young Borrowers’ Student Loans (2020 - 2022 Panel)

We start by computing, for each borrower, the ratio between the borrower’s outstanding student loan balance in 2009 and in each subsequent year through 2022. We then calculate several percentiles (ten, twenty-five, fifty, seventy-five, and ninety) for the distribution in each year. The graphs below illustrate how each of them evolve over time. The plot on the left corresponds to the 446,000 borrowers with outstanding loans in 2018. Aside from the large amount of heterogeneity in repayment paths, it shows that almost none of the borrowers in this group completed their repayment within the standard ten-year time frame for student loans. By 2019, ten years after we first observed them, almost half of the borrowers owed more than they did in 2009, while a quarter owed at least twice as much.

The plot on the right restricts the sample further to the subset of 206,000 borrowers who had at least one loan that was growing in balance in the twelve months leading to 2020. These results show that this group’s repayment struggles in 2020 were not a one-off event: by 2019, three-quarters owed more than they did in 2009.

In both plots, for the higher percentiles, we see a slight reversal of this pattern of accumulation after 2020, which coincides with the enactment of the repayment pause. The similarity of the shapes for those at P75 and P90, along with the different levels relative to 2009, suggests that the effect on the left-side panel is being driven by borrowers.
with increasing balances in the years leading up to 2020, which validates our decision to focus on them when analyzing the pause’s effect.

**Current balance as a share of 2009 starting balance**

![Graph showing repayment progress, measured by the outstanding student loan balance in each year as a share of the 2009 starting balance, by selected percentiles (2009-2022 Panel), with each plot representing the corresponding panel sub-sample.](image)

We focus in particular on the subset of 206,000 student borrowers who had at least one loan that was growing in balance in the lead-up to 2020—and were therefore presumably struggling with repayment. Within this subset, we define as beneficiaries of repayment pause those who have at least one loan whose balance becomes stagnant once the pause is enacted. We compare them with the subset of borrowers who have at least one loan whose balance increased in the same period. This method differs from previous publications and working papers, which evaluated the pause’s impact by comparing borrowers with federal loans against those with private loans, at least notionally. The reasons why we adopt our novel approach are as follows:

1. Within a given age group or cohort of borrowers (i.e., those who entered higher education at the same time), those with federal direct loans are more likely to have taken out a student loan after 2010, when all new federal loans became direct. They are thus part of a fundamentally different economic life cycle than borrowers of the same age who do not have federal direct loans and probably had no contact with the student lending system after 2010. In other work using the
same credit panel (of borrowers with outstanding student debt in 2009), we refer to these post-2010 loans as “re-enrollment loans” if they are not being used to refinance outstanding debt. That research showed that borrowers with re-enrollment loans experienced long-lasting effects of the Great Recession, which set them back financially, relative to borrowers who did not have re-enrollment loans. Hence, comparing the two groups is not an apples-to-apples quasi-experiment. The repayment pause disproportionately helped the borrowers with re-enrollment loans, but they were also disproportionately in need of that help.

2. The credit reporting data that we use, derived from Experian, does not actually report whether a loan is federal direct, FFEL, or private. Instead it reports monthly required payment amounts. For many loans, that number is reported as zero after March 2020, when the repayment pause went into effect, leading previous researchers to conclude it denotes a loan that is eligible for the repayment pause. However, that inference is not so straightforward, at least as we understand the construction of that variable:

a. Experian does not observe the monthly required payment unless the servicer(s) from which they gather their data report it. Some do not, or do not for all loans they service. In those cases, Experian attempts to impute the required payment.

b. Crucially, the imputation can take the value of zero due to the credit reporting agency’s guess, not the actual status of the loan. Additionally, it can also take a value of zero if the required payment is not reported and Experian is unable to impute it. We have not developed a means of differentiating these “false zeroes,” because the monthly payment amount wasn’t reported, from the “true zeroes,” denoting that a borrower didn’t have to make payments during the pause. Nor do we know the relative prevalence of the two types of reported zero monthly required payment in the data.

For these reasons, we choose to measure whether a loan had its payments paused based on the loan balance trajectory and the actual payments made, and not the scheduled monthly payment amount variable. Our de facto treatment group is borrowers whose balances were growing prior to 2020 and had at least one loan move to stagnant-balance thereafter. Our control group is borrowers whose balances were growing prior to 2020 and had at least one loan whose balance continued growing between 2020 and 2021. Since we take this “mutually inclusive” approach, the same borrower might be in both groups, if they had loans in multiple repayment categories. However, the “mutually exclusive”
approach that would drop borrowers with loans in more than one repayment category yields very similar results, so we choose to report the results derived from a larger sample.

We start by focusing on student debt outcomes—total loan balance, delinquent loan balance, and delinquency share (delinquent balance over total balance)—along with credit scores. The figure below shows their evolution, across the two groups (balance-increasing against stagnant balance), for each of the outcomes, between 2016 and 2022. For each of the outcomes, there is a substantially more positive evolution for the group affected by the repayment pause. Prior to the pause, borrowers who benefitted had higher loan balances—a disparity that reversed once the pause was enacted. The unaffected group had credit scores around five-to-seven points higher between 2016 and 2019. The gap was fully closed by 2022 (top right). Likewise, the delinquent balances and share of delinquent borrowers had a much steeper decline in the group affected by the pause.

![Figure 2.3: Repayment pause effect on student debt outcomes, for the affected (Growing-to-stagnant) and comparison (Growing-to-growing) groups](image)

7 The month of reference for our data is always June, and therefore the 2020 data we have access to corresponds to a time period subsequent to the enactment of the repayment pause.
We also looked at non-student debt outcomes, particularly those related to mortgages and medical debt. Regarding the former, while we observe accelerated convergence between the groups on mortgage balances and share of borrowers with a mortgage (top panels in the figure below), this convergence appears to begin before the pause. The more striking effects have to do with the likelihood of being a first-time buyer (bottom right panel): while the gap between the two groups is relatively stable between 2017-2019, it doubles by 2022, which strongly suggests that the relief provided by the pause had a substantial effect on the likelihood of being able to buy a home, presumably by facilitating the process of saving for a down payment or rendering mortgage payments affordable (or both).

**Figure 2.4:** Repayment pause effect on homeownership-related outcomes, for the affected (Growing-to-stagnant) and comparison (Growing-to-growing) groups

When it comes to medical debt in collections (right panel in the figure below), the fast convergence after the pause reveals that it potentially helped student borrowers pay down other debts they had long been saddled with.
The Student Debt Repayment Pause

Figure 2.5: Repayment pause effect on medical debt outcomes, for the affected (Growing-to-stagnant) and comparison (Growing-to-growing) groups

The figures above have a clear implication: ending the repayment pause is very likely to erase the progress that has been made since March 2020. Recall that both groups of borrowers compared here had growing balances prior to the enactment of the repayment pause and also had had outstanding student debt since at least 2009, and probably significantly before that. Their average balances are north of $60,000. Hence, even if the proposed administrative cancellation is enacted, those borrowers will still be left with outstanding debt.

Additionally, ending the pause will worsen gender and racial inequality. The figure below illustrates the repayment progress (or lack thereof) for the panel, which was initially sampled to be nationally representative of eighteen-to-thirty-four year old student borrowers in 2009: by 2019, when, as per the standard ten year plan, borrowers should be completing their repayment, women as a whole hold a higher volume of debt than they did in 2009. Men began making progress after 2012, but still had more than eighty percent of their 2009 debt. While the pause does not shrink the gender gap, it enabled women to make progress on repayment and by 2022 they held lower balances than in 2009.

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8 The identifier for gender is not present for every borrower in every year and is not necessarily always consistent (though it is so for the clear majority of borrowers). As a result, we assign each borrower their modal gender; in the cases where there is a tie, we assign a missing value and such borrowers will be automatically dropped from the ensuing analysis. To assign race, we rely on census tract composition and similarly assign each individual a race depending on the modal census tract race plurality where they lived between 2009 and 2022; as with gender, cases where there is a tie are dropped and not part of the analysis.
Figure 2.6: Repayment progress, measured by the outstanding student loan balance in each year as a share of the 2009 starting balance, by gender (2009-2022 Panel)

Inequality across race groups follows similar trends, to an even starker degree. Similarly to women, Black and Latino borrowers hold a substantially higher volume of debt in 2019 than in 2009. Black borrowers as a whole, in particular, saw their balance rise every single year until 2020, when their outstanding balance represented 162 percent of their 2009 balance. By contrast, white borrowers made some progress and by 2020 owed 90 percent of their 2009 balance. For Black and Latino borrowers, it was only after the pause that some progress was visible: reversing it, especially without debt relief, will likely mean a return to widening racial inequality.
Conclusion

This analysis offers insights into reparative measures the US government took during the Covid-19 pandemic to ameliorate that crisis’s effect on student borrowers. For three-plus years, the government chose not to force borrowers to repay their student loans, with the result that balances stopped rising as fast as they previously were, as reported in our 2020 publication “The Student Debt Crisis is a Crisis of Non-repayment.” Indeed, the borrowers who accumulated the most student debt actually saw their balances decline for the first time since (at least) 2009. By contrast with the disappointing record of the department’s previously-existing IDR programs, the repayment pause is associated with multiple financial improvements across a student borrower’s credit profile, from delinquencies and credit scores to homeownership.

A student loan system that doesn’t actually involve people repaying their student loans during normal times, but does have them repaying their student loans when they’re not required to do so, cannot be said to be functioning well. Switching the apparatus of mandatory repayment back on is not going to result in actual repayment. Instead, without
changes to the student lending system, the trend of increasing balances is expected to recur when the repayment pause ends in 2023. The return to normalcy the administration evidently desires is a return to increasing, rather than decreasing, student loan balances.

That is particularly significant in light of the hundred-plus billion dollars of new student loans the federal government originates every year, most of which are unlikely to be repaid. The administration (and policy-makers broadly) appear to want above all a “return to normal,” when they imagine student borrowers will be productively repaying loans and there won’t be so much political conflict over student debt. Alas, the “normal” state of our current system doesn’t entail borrowers repaying their loans. Rather, it entails borrowers not repaying loans and, furthermore, facing rising balances. Returning to this type of “normal” will endanger the progress made by borrowers over the past three years.